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Subjective Performance Evaluation and Inequality Aversion
*
 
Many firms use subjective performance appraisal systems due to lack of objective 
performance measures. In these cases, supervisors usually have to rate the performance of 
their subordinates. Using such systems, it is a well established fact that many supervisors 
tend to assess the employees too good (leniency bias) and that the appraisals hardly vary 
across employees of a certain supervisor (centrality bias). We explain these two biases in a 
model with a supervisor, who has preferences for the utility of her inequality averse 
subordinates, and discuss determinants of the size of the biases. Extensions of the basic 
model include the role of supervisor’s favoritism of one particular agent and the endogenous 
effort choice of agents. Whether inequality averse agents exert higher efforts then purely self-
oriented ones, depends on the size of effort costs and inequality aversion. 
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1. Introduction 
Performance appraisal is one of the most frequently discussed topics of human resource 
management research.
1 Systematic performance appraisal systems can be implemented for 
several purposes including promotion and training decisions, performance based variable pay 
and personnel planning (Cleveland et al. 1989). In many cases it is not possible to obtain 
objective performance measures on an individual base. Besides, existing objective measures 
usually correspond only to part of employees’ tasks, which may lead to distorted incentives 
(Milgrom & Roberts 1988, Holmström & Milgrom 1991). Therefore, many firms implement 
some kind of subjective performance evaluation. 
Subjective performance evaluation, however, is also fraught with some problems. One issue is 
that the accuracy of ratings is not given automatically. If the rater is a residual claimant (i.e. 
the owner of a firm) and the appraisal affects some kind of variable pay, she may underreport 
the performance of her subordinates in order to save costs. However, many supervisors are no 
residual claimants but themselves employed workers in multi layered firms. Therefore, 
supervisors can also be interpreted as agents with own utility functions, which may deviate 
from the principal’s objectives. In this situation possible rater biases include the centrality 
bias and the leniency bias.
2 In many firms the majority of employees get ratings above the 
average mark. Therefore, the appraisals are by definition skewed to the top end of the scale 
and supervisors rate some kind of lenient (e.g. Jawahar & Williams 1997). Besides, several 
studies find that only a small fraction of possible performance levels is used by the 
supervisors when evaluating subordinates. They tend to differentiate only slightly between 
employees (e.g. Murphy & Cleveland 1991). These biases may not only be inefficient for 
firms but also lead to the problem that the performance appraisal system is not accepted by 
several employees as Murphy (1992) observes for the pharma company Merck & Co, Inc. 
More than 70 percent of employees are located in only three of 13 performance categories and 




                                                 
1 Bretz et al. (1992) as well as Levy & Williams (2004) provide extensive surveys of the literature. 
2 Other biases that are discussed in the literature include the halo, primacy and recency effect (see e.g. Murphy & 
Cleveland 1995).   2
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Note: 1 = unacceptable performance, 5 = exceptional performance. 
Source: Murphy (1992), p. 40. 
 
Several reasons for these biases are discussed in the empirical literature. If supervisors are not 
rewarded for accurate ratings, they may have insufficient motivation to invest time in 
gathering information (Fox et al. 1983). Furthermore, they may also face cognitive limitations 
and tend to focus on some performance dimensions (Ittner et al. 2003) or arbitrarily favor 
certain employees e.g. to encourage loyalty or to serve their self-interest (Ferris & Judge 
1991). Besides, supervisors may have a preference for a pleasant relationship with their 
subordinates (Varma et al. 1996). Negative feedback may lead to undesirable discussions and 
is therefore avoided if possible.
3 
The contributions of Prendergast and Topel (1996) as well as Prendergast (2002) are two of 
the few theoretical studies which provide explanations for the leniency bias by assuming that 
the well-being of subordinates is part of the supervisor’s utility function. In Prendergast and 
Topel (1996) a supervisor can distort her reports but is monitored by the management. Since 
biased reports lead to inefficient job assignments, management punishes the supervisor if her 
report deviates from the management’s own observation. Similarly, Prendergast (2002) 
assumes that the supervisor faces some cost when deviating from the truth. Both contributions 
                                                 
3 See also Bol (2005) for a more detailed overview of the literature.   3
show that favoritism increases with the worker’s incentives.
4 Assessments are distorted 
upwards the more the supervisor likes a particular agent and downwards the more she dislikes 
a subordinate. 
In this paper we build on this argument and additionally assume that employees are inequality 
averse to each other. We can simultaneously explain both the leniency bias and the centrality 
bias within our simple model. If agents are inequality averse, it is obvious that agents profit 
from distorted ratings to the mean from an ex post perspective. However, it is not obvious 
how ex ante incentives of different agents are affected assuming that there is uncertainty in 
the production technology. We show that the effect of distorted ratings on incentives depends 
on the type of the agent (purely self-interested versus inequality averse). While purely self-
interested agents are not influenced by distorted ratings, the behavior of inequality averse 
agents changes. If the supervisor distorts reports, there are situations, in which very inequality 
averse agents exert higher efforts than purely self-interested agents.    
It is now more and more accepted that inequality aversion is an important driving force of 
human behavior in many situations. Based on experiments by e.g. Loewenstein et al. (1989), 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as well as Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) provide suggestions for 
operationalizations of inequality aversion in economic models. Recent applications of 
inequality aversion in principal-agent-models include individual (Itoh, 2004, Neilson & 
Stowe, 2004, Mayer & Pfeiffer, 2004, Englmaier & Wambach, 2005, Demougin et al., 2005) 
and team based incentive contracts (Itoh 2004, Demougin & Fluet 2003a, Biel 2004), rank-
order tournaments (Demougin & Fluet 2003b, Grund & Sliwka 2005) and adverse selection 
problems (von Siemens 2005, Desiraju & Sappington 2007). However, inequality aversion 
has not been applied to performance appraisal issues so far. Simultaneously and 
independently from this paper Sliwka (2007b) gives another explanation for the centrality bias 
by incorporating two (not identical) signals of the agents’ performances for a supervisor and a 
principal. The centrality bias is due to the supervisor’s inequity aversion and a regression to 
the mean effect of the supervisor’s report, because she wants to avoid own disadvantages 
from deviating from the principal’s signal. 
 
                                                 
4 Sliwka (2007a) provides a different model on performance appraisal with one loss averse agent and shows in a 
two period model that the leniency bias becomes more relevant over time. MacLeod (2003) investigates optimal 
contracts with subjective performance evaluations when the signals of a principal and an agent about the 
performance of the agent are not correlated. In order to avoid conflicts with the agent the supervisor (who is the 
principal in this case) compresses the ratings at the top which is similar to the centrality bias.   4
In the next section we proceed by providing a simple model. A supervisor has to appraise the 
performance of two employees. Her utility depends on the firm’s profit and on the well-being 
of her inequality averse subordinates. We simultaneously explain both the centrality and 
leniency bias within this simple model. We also discuss determinants of the degree of both 
biases and extent the model to a situation with favoritism, when the supervisor has 
preferences for the well-being of only one subordinate (section 3). Furthermore, agents may 
anticipate the biased reports of the supervisor and endogenously choose efforts levels. We 
discuss this case in section 4 and show that efforts with biased reports are higher compared to 
a situation with unbiased reports if the amount of inequality aversion is rather high. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. A simple model 
Suppose that a supervisor S has to assess the performance of two agents i and j (i and j = 1, 2; 
i ≠ j) to determine their wages. Her verifiable report for agent i is characterized by the term            
ri > 0. We assume that the supervisor is not a residual claimant, but employed in a firm. She 
observes the true performance pi > 0 of both agents and then has to state a report ri for each 
agent. The wage Wi of agent i consists of two components. He receives a performance 
appraisal contingent bonus bri (b > 0) in addition to his fixed wage w > 0, i.e. Wi = w + bri. 
For simplicity we assume that both agents are equally inequality averse. To model their 
utilities we use the utility function proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). If the performance 
appraisal of i is lower than the performance appraisal of j, agent i is jealous of j. The resulting 
disutility increases in the difference of the performance ratings (rj – ri), in the report 
dependent wage component b, and in the degree of disadvantageous inequality aversion α. If 
instead agent i is better assessed, he may feel some kind of compassion or guilt with agent j. 
The extent of such feelings is given by the parameter β. Thus, the utility function of an agent 
who is inequality averse is given by   
Ui (ri, rj) = Wi – α (max {Wj – Wi, 0}) – β (max {Wi – Wj, 0})           
          = w + b ri – α (max {w + b rj – (w + b ri), 0}) – β (max {w + b ri – (w + b rj), 0})
          = w + b ri – α (max {b (rj – ri), 0}) – β (max {b (ri – rj), 0})                  
         ,   i ≠ j and 0 ≤ β < 1, 0 ≤ α.
5 
                                                 
5 Agents are assumed to be inequality averse with respect to outcomes and do not take inputs (e.g. efforts) into 
account. We think this is a reasonable assumption since there is evidence that the vast majority of employees   5
The special case of α = β = 0 pictures the utility of two purely self-interested agents who are 
only interested in their own wage. We assume β < 1. This implies that agent i cares more for 
his own utility than for the other agent’s utility. In their seminal paper Fehr and Schmidt 
assume that α > β. We do not need this assumption for our model. Dannenberg et al. (2007) 
provide experimental evidence that the opposite may be true in some circumstances. 
Furthermore, we assume that the supervisor is interested in the accuracy of her statement and 
in the utilities of the agents. On the one hand, the supervisor suffers from costs ()
2
i i p r v − , if 
her report deviates from her observation. Hereby, v > 0 measures the intensity of these costs 
from distorting evaluations. These costs may picture the potential cost of being fired if found 
out to have stated distorted evaluations.
6 On the other hand, S cares for the utilities of the 
agents. For example, she may want to avoid arguments with the agents and a negative 
working atmosphere in general (Bernardin & Buckley 1981). The strength of this factor is 
represented by the parameter μ. The supervisor’s utility function is therefore given by 
US (ri, rj| pi, pj) = μ (w + b ri – α (max {b (rj – ri), 0}) – β (max{ b (ri – rj), 0}) 
                          + w + b rj – α (max {b (ri – rj), 0}) – β (max {b (rj – ri), 0})) 
                – v (ri – pi)
2 – v (rj – pj)
2                               , μ ≥ 0. 
Before deriving the optimal reports of the supervisor for inequality averse agents, we 
determine the performance appraisals for situations usually analyzed in more traditional 
economic models. The results can be taken as benchmarks compared to the results of our 
model: 
1.) If the supervisor is merely self-oriented and does not care for her agents’ utilities            
(μ = 0), it is easy to show that she will report the true performances    
  ri = pi        (i = 1, 2)                         
by deriving her utility function with respect to the reports, because there would only 
costs but no benefits from deviating from the observations. 
2.) If the supervisor cares for agents’ utilities (μ > 0) and the agents are not inequality 
averse but purely self-interested (α = β = 0), the supervisor maximizes μ (w + bri + w 
+ brj) – v (ri – pi)
2 – v (rj – pj)
2. Solving the first order condition for ri lead to the 
                                                                                                                                                          
consider themselves as top performers (Meyer 1975) so that differences in efforts will usually not be perceived 
equally across employees. 
6 Prendergast (2002) makes a similar assumption.   6
optimal  appraisals             






      (i =   1 ,   2 ) .          
In this case the supervisor overstates the agents’ performances (r > p). This result can 
be interpreted as the leniency bias. The size of this bias is increasing in the degree of 
the supervisor’s preference for the agents’ utilities and the monetary incentives of the 
agents. It is decreasing in the supervisor’s costs of giving deviated reports. Each 
employee is upgraded to the same degree so that there is no centrality bias in this case. 
In our model the supervisor also has to choose r1 and r2 – given her observations p1 and p2 – 
to maximize her utility by taking the inequality aversion of the agents into account. Note that 
the supervisor’s utility function depends on her reports. Thus, we have to distinguish three 
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The case of equal reports can also be integrated into the other parts of the supervisor’s utility 
function so that we can write this as 





≤ − − − − − − + − − +
≥ − − − − − − + − − +
=
.   if      ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( 2 [
  if     ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( 2 [
2 2
2 2
j i j j i i i j j i j i
j i j j i i j i j j i i
S r r p r v p r v r r b br r r b br w





Assume that S observes pi > pj. She wants to maximize her utility and has to decide whether it 
is optimal to choose different or equal reports for the agents. To determine the optimal reports 
ri and rj, we first look at the first part of her utility function. If S decides to choose a higher 
report for agent i or equal reports for both agents, she maximizes this part of her utility 
function subject to the constraint ri ≥ rj which leads to  
( )  r ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( 2 [ i
2 2
j j j i i j i j j i i r p r v p r v r r b br r r b br w L − + − − − − − − + − − + = λ α β μ .  
The resulting Kuhn-Tucker-conditions are 
0   ) ( 2 ) 1 ( = + − − − − λ α β μ i i p r v b                             (K1) 
() 0 ) ( 2 1 = − − − + + λ α β μ j j p r v b                            (K2)   7
0 ≥ λ , j i r r ≥ ,  ( ) 0 = − j i r r λ                                        (K3) 
From adding K1 and K2 we obtain 
j i j i r r p p v b + = + + / μ .                                           (K4) 
Possible solutions include both different and equal reports. If S chooses  j i r r > , it follows 
from K3 that the Lagrangian multiplierλ  has to be zero. From K1 and K2 we obtain the 
evaluations for agent i and j  
i
diff
i p v b r + − − = 2 / ) 1 ( β α μ  and  j
diff
j p v b r + + + = 2 / ) 1 (   β α μ .
7  
However, the first part of the supervisor’s utility function is only valid for the range 
diff
i r  > 
diff
j r  so that 
v b p p j i / ) ( β α μ + > −                      (1) 
has to hold. Since the term on the right side of inequality (1) is positive, the difference of the 
(observed) performances has to be sufficiently positive, too. Agent i has to outperform his 




j r . Note that the right hand side of (1) is increasing in the inequality aversion 
parameters  α and β. This is intuitive since it captures an agent’s higher disutility when 
obtaining a report different from the one of his colleague. Furthermore, the right hand side is 
increasing in μ and in the report dependent wage component b while decreasing in the 
supervisor’s costs vof deviating from the observed performances.  
S may choose ri = rj in some cases, so that the agents cannot suffer from inequality. In this 
case we either have (I) 0 = λ  or (II) 0 > λ (see K3).  
(I) If  0 = λ  and  v b p p j i / ) ( β α μ + = −  the reports solving all Kuhn-Tucker-conditions K1 to 
K3 are  i
even
i p v b r + − − = 2 / ) 1 ( β α μ  and j
even





i r r = ( ) 2 / 2 /   j i
even p p v b r + + = = μ .
8 
                                                 
7 To capture the idea of different reports we will write 
diff
i r and 
diff
j r  (i, j = 1, 2 and i ≠ j).   8




i r r = ( ) 2 / 2 /   j i
even p p v b r + + = = μ  from K4. Subtracting K1 from K2 leads to the 
relevant condition for stating these reports: v b p p j i / ) ( β α μ + < − . If this condition is 
satisfied, the reports 
even
i r  and 
even
j r  solve the Kuhn-Tucker-conditions K1 to K3.  
A similar reasoning can be applied to the maximization of the second part of the supervisor’s 
utility function subject to the constraint ri ≤ rj.
9
  It is never optimal for the supervisor to give 
agent j a better rating, while she observes that agent i is the top performer (see Appendix A). 
If S observes that agent i’s performance is better than the performance of agent j, the only 
solution to the maximization problem of the second part of the utility function is to state equal 




i p p v b r r + + = = μ . Since the first part of the supervisor’s utility 
function corresponds to the second part of the utility function if reports are equal, different 
reports are only optimal if v b p p j i / ) ( β α μ + > − . Otherwise S sets equal reports. 
The derivation of the optimal reports when agent j’s performance is at least as good as the 
performance of agent i follows analogously. Our results are summarized in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1: 
If both agents are inequality averse and the performance difference between the better 
agent i and the worse agent j is sufficiently large, i.e.  v b p p j i / ) ( β α μ + > − , the 
supervisor optimally reports  i
diff
i p v b r + − − = 2 / ) 1 ( β α μ  and 
j
diff
j p v b r + + + = 2 / ) 1 ( β α μ . If the performance difference is rather small, i.e., 
    /v ) (   /v ) ( β α μ β α μ + ≤ − ≤ + − b p p b j i , the supervisor announces equal reports 




i p p v b r r + + = = μ . 
It is easy to see that the supervisor’s reports picture both the centrality bias and the leniency 
bias. If there are large performance differences between the agents, the supervisor tries to 
diminish the wage gap between the agents. This effect represents the centrality bias. The 
higher α  andβ , i.e. the more inequality averse the agents are, the larger is the range of equal 
reports and the larger the centrality bias.  
                                                                                                                                                          
8 To capture the idea of equal reports we will write 
even
i r  for i = 1, 2. 
9 The relevant Lagrange function and the resulting Kuhn-Tucker-conditions can be found in Appendix A.   9
Given that  1 < + β α  holds, both agents’ performance ratings are higher than their observed 
performances, which represents the leniency bias. Otherwise, only the report for the agent 
with the lower observed performance is adjusted upwards. In this case the sum of the upward 
bias for the weaker employee and the downward bias for the top performer is always positive, 
so that the leniency bias always exists in sum. This distortion increases in the preference of 
the supervisor for the agents’ utilities (μ) and in the report dependent wage component (b). It 
is decreasing in her costs v of deviating from the observed performances.  
Inspecting the case of equal reports 
even r , it is also straightforward that the supervisor 
generally rates the agent with the lower observed performance with leniency. However, 
similar to the case of different reports this does not always hold for the report for the agent 
with the higher observed performance. Again, the size of the leniency bias depends on the 
inequality aversion parameters α  and β . Assume that  j i p p > , then     i
even
i p r > if 
v b p p j i / μ < − . Proposition 1 states that the supervisor announces 
even
i r  and 
even
j r  if 
/v ) (   /v ) ( β α μ β α μ + ≤ − ≤ + − b p p b j i . Consequently the report for agent i is only adjusted 
upwards if  1 < + β α . In contrast the report for agent i is lower than his observed 
performance, if  1 > + β α  and v b p p v b j i / ) ( / β α μ μ + ≤ − < . However, the upward bias for 
the weaker agent always outweighs the possible downward bias for the better one. 
If the agents’ performances are exactly the same (pi  = pj = p), the supervisor reports 
p v b r
even
i + = 2 / μ  (for i = 1, 2). This is the only case, in which the performance appraisals for 
inequality averse agents correspond to the reports for self-interested agents simply because 
there is no inequality. The leniency bias is also present in the case of purely self-interested 
agents, but the centrality bias cannot be explained.  
 
3. Favoritism 
In our basic model of section 2 we assume that the supervisor favors all agents. However, it 
may well be the case that a supervisor has only preferences for one of two subordinates (her 
favorite). For example, the supervisor knows one agent well and/or wants to reciprocate 
previous loyalty. In contrast, the other worker and the supervisor have no special relationship.   10
For simplicity, we assume  0 1 > = f μ μ  and  0 2 = = nf μ μ  to investigate performance 
appraisals in such a situation.
10 Therefore, the supervisor only favors agent 1. Now optimal 
reports of the supervisor depend on the actual size of the inequality parameters of agent 1, α  
and  β , and on the size of the observed performance difference nf f p p − . Again, we have to 
distinguish between three cases.  
First, if agent 1 is doing sufficiently better than agent 2, i.e. v b B p p f nf f 2 / ) 1 2 ( − = > − β μ ,
11 
the supervisor reports  f f
diff
f p v b r + − = 2 / ) 1 ( β μ  and  nf f
diff
nf p v b r + = 2 /   β μ . The favorite, 




nf r . These reports are similar to the reports in 
section 2. Since the supervisor now only cares for agent 1, the upward bias of the reports is 
increasing in f μ . Although agent 2 is jealous of agent 1, the supervisor neglects this fact. 
Thus, in contrast to 
diff r1 and 
diff r 2  of section 2, the envy parameter α of agent 2 does not 
influence and align reports. Note that B  will be negative if β < ½. Therefore, the supervisor 
even upgrades agent 1 if his observed performance is (slightly) worse than agent 2’s observed 
performance, if agent 1 does not feel much compassion with agent 2 when receiving a higher 
report. Both agents’ ratings are higher than their observed performance which symbolizes the 
leniency bias. Although agent 1 is the favorite, he may be less upgraded than the other agent 
in some situations. This is a consequence of agent 1’s compassion for agent 2. Therefore, the 
supervisor wants to avoid a large difference in evaluations, which leads to the centrality bias 
again.  
Second, if agents’ performances differ only slightly, i.e. 
≥ = − B v b f 2 / ) 1 2 ( β μ v b B p p f nf f 2 / ) 1 2 ( + − = ≥ − α μ ,
12 the supervisor evaluates both 




f p p v b r r + + = = 5 . 0 4 /   μ . This expression pictures 
the centrality bias. The range of this interval is increasing in the inequality aversion 
parameters of agent 1 (i.e. the higher α  and β ), is increasing in the degree the supervisor 
cares for his favorite (the higher f μ ), is increasing in the report dependent wage component b 
and is decreasing in the costs vof deviating from the truth. A comparison of 
even
f r    with 
even r  
of section 2 reveals that the first term  v b f 4 / μ  is half of that of 
even r . Thus, the first term is 
                                                 
10 The index “f” indicates that agent 1 is the favorite and the index “nf”indicates that agent 2 is not the favorite. 
11 A derivation of the threshold  B can be found in Appendix B. 
12 We derive  B  in Appendix B.   11
influenced by the number of agents the supervisor cares for. If β < 1/2 so that B  is negative, 
both agents receive the same ratings although agent 1’s performance is worse than agent 2’s 
performance. If β > 1/2 (B  is positive), it is possible that reports are equal although agent 1’s 
observed performance is (slightly) better than the observed performance of agent 2. This is 
intuitive since a better rating would make agent 1 feel sorry for agent 2 and decrease his 
utility. Note that  f
even
f p r >   . Therefore, agent 1’s performance rating is affected by the 
leniency bias. In contrast, agent 2’s rating is lower than his true performance if 
B p p v b nf f f ≥ − > − 2 / μ . Only if the observed performances are sufficiently close to each 
other, both ratings are biased upwards. Otherwise, only agent 1 profits from the evaluation. 
However, the upward bias for agent 1 always outweighs the possible downward bias of agent 
2.  
Third, if  B p p nf f < − , appraisals are    2 / ) 1 ( ˆ f f
diff
f p v b r + + = α μ  and 
v b p r f nf
diff
nf 2 / ˆ α μ − = . Now agent 1 obtains a lower performance assessment than agent 2. 
Nevertheless, the assessment of agent 1 is higher than his observed performance (leniency 
bias) while the opposite is true for agent 2. The bias is a consequence of agent 1 being jealous 
of agent 2’s good performance. While the report of agent 1 is similar to that without 
favoritism of one particular agent in section 2, this does not hold for agent 2’s report. In 
section 2 there are parameter ranges for α and β so that the report for agent 2 is biased 
upwards. If agent 1 is the favorite and the supervisor does not care for agent 2, this is not 
possible anymore. The considerations of this section can be summarized in proposition 2. 
Proposition 2: 
If the supervisor only cares for one agent, she reports 




f p p v b r r + + = = 5 . 0 4 /   μ  if  ≥ B B p p nf f ≥ −  and   
(ii) different reports  
(1)  f f
diff
f p v b r + − = 2 / ) 1 ( β μ   and  nf f
diff
nf p v b r + = 2 /   β μ   if  B p p nf f > −          
as well as  
(2)    2 / ) 1 ( ˆ f f
diff
f p v b r + + = α μ and v b p r f nf
diff
nf 2 / ˆ α μ − =  if  B p p nf f < − . 
   12
4. Endogenous Effort Choice of Agents 
In the last two sections we analysed the supervisor’s performance appraisal decision when the 
agents’ performances (and therefore efforts) were exogenously given. Now we want to 
investigate how the agents’ incentives to exert effort and perform well are influenced by the 
biased reports of the supervisor if they anticipate her behavior.
13 Thus, agents endogenously 
choose their efforts which determine their observed performance levels. We compare efforts 
in such a situation with a situation in which the supervisor does not care for the agents’ 
utilities, i.e. a situation of unbiased reports. 
The supervisor cannot observe the agents’ efforts (and effort costs) but observes their 
performances p1 and p2.
14 On the basis of these observations she states her reports r1 and r2. 
For simplicity we assume that there are only two performance levels: a low performance level 
L p > 0 and a high performance level  H p  > 0 with v b p p L H / ) ( β α μ + > − .
15 Both agents 
simultaneously choose their efforts  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ i e . When exerting effort  i e , an agent realizes  H p  
with probability  i e  and  L p with probability 1– i e  and suffers from effort costs  2 / ) (
2
i i ce e C = . 
We assume                                        
) 1 )( ( α + − > L H p p b c > 0.                                                                                       (2). 
This condition ensures that we only take interior solutions of optimal effort levels into 
consideration since the objective function is strictly concave. Moreover, we presume that 
supervisor and agents are mutually aware of their utility functions. Besides, all other 
assumptions from section 2 apply to this section as well. 
Initially, we will explore effort choices for purely self-interested agents as a benchmark. We 
will compare the situation of an egoistic supervisor with the case that the supervisor cares for 
the two agents. Then, we will proceed by determining agents’ effort choices for the case of 
agents’ inequality aversion. 
 
 
                                                 
13 This is different from Prendergast (2002). An agent does not expect the supervisor’s favoritism and therefore 
his incentives are not affected in his contribution.  
14 We assume that the participation constraint does not bind and thus both agents work for the firm. 
15 This assumption ensures that the supervisor chooses different reports for i and j in the case of deviating 
observations of performances.   13
4.1 Self-interested Agents 
First, we look at the behavior of purely self-interested agents and consider the case of a 
supervisor, who does not care for agents’ utilities. She, therefore, always reports the agents’ 
true performance levels (ri = pi) so that reports are unbiased. An agent’s expected utility (EU) 
is given by his fixed wage plus the expected bonus minus the effort costs:                         
EUi,unbiased,ego = w + ei  b H p  + (1 – ei) b L p –  2 /
2
i ce .
16      
Solving the first order condition  0 ) ( / = − + − = ∂ ∂ L H i i p p b ce e EU  leads to the optimal effort 
of a self-interested (egoistic) agent:
  
c I c p p b e L H ego unbiased i / / ) (
*
, , ≡ − = .        
) ( L H p p b I − =  represents the marginal return for a purely self-oriented agent from achieving 
the high performance in the case of unbiased reports.
  It is obvious that 
*
, , ego unbiased i e  is 
decreasing in the effort costs parameter c. The more an agent receives from exerting effort 
(the higher the performance dependent wage component and the difference between the two 
performance levels) the higher is his effort level.   
If the supervisor cares for the agents’ utilities and therefore distorts her reports in the sense 
we have derived in section 2, the expected utility of an agent is given by 

















17   
The first order condition  0 ) ( / = − + − = ∂ ∂ L H i i p p b ce e EU  leads to  
c I e ego biased i /
*
, , = .          
Hence, efforts are independent of the supervisor’s preferences for egoistic agents. If the 
supervisor states biased reports, she upgrades her statements by  v b 2 / μ  independent of the 
realized performance level. We, therefore, can formulate  
 
                                                 
16 The index “unbiased“ indicates that the supervisor states the true performance while the index “ego” indicates 
the case of purely self-oriented agents. 
17 The index “biased” indicates that the supervisor does not report the true observed performances.   14
Proposition 3a: 
There is no incentive effect of report distortions for purely self-interested agents. 
 
4.2 Inequality Averse Agents and Unbiased Reports 
We now look at the behavior of inequality averse agents. First, we consider the case of 
unbiased reports with the supervisor reporting the agents’ true performances (ri  = pi). 
Therefore, an agent’s expected utility is given by
18 
EUi,unbiased,averse = w + ei ej (b  H p ) + (1 – ei) (1 – ej) (b L p )               
+ (1 – ei) ej (b  L p  – αb ( H p – L p )) + ei (1 – ej) (b H p  – βb ( H p – L p )) –  2 /
2
i ce . 
If both agents realize the same low or high performance level, there are no inequality costs. 
However, agents suffer from inequality if they face different results. The first order condition  
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( / = + − + + − − − + − = ∂ ∂ β α β α β L j H j L H L H i i p be p be p p b p p b ce e EU  gives us 
the optimal effort of agent i given effort  j e : 
( ) c I e I e e j j i / ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( β α β + + − = . 
Intuitively, ambiguous effects are influencing the optimal effort here. Suppose that only agent 
i exerts effort (which, of course, cannot be an equilibrium). Then agent i is willing to exert the 
higher effort the more he can receive in the good state (when  H p  is realized). Having realized 
the good state while the other agent is worse off, makes agent i feel compassion with his 
colleague and so his effort decreases in β. Let us call this negative effect the being ahead 
effect. If agent j did not exert effort, agent i could never be jealous of the other agent. Thus, 
his marginal return from achieving the high performance level is lower than the marginal 
return for a purely self-interested agent. If agent j exerts effort, too, it is possible that agent i 
has a lower compensation than agent j ex post and is envious. Hence, agent i wants to avoid 
this situation and his effort increases in α. Furthermore, the negative influence of β on agent 
i’s effort is diminished but not cancelled out as long as there is still a positive probability that 
agent j realizes L p . We call this effect the partner effort effect. The higher this effect is the 
higher are the incentives to exert effort and to achieve the high performance level. 
                                                 
18 The index “averse” indicates that both agents are inequality averse.   15
In the symmetric Nash equilibrium ( averse unbiased averse unbiased e e , , 2
*
, , 1
* = ) both agents exert effort 
I c
I
e averse unbiased i ) (
) 1 ( *





Comparative statics show that 
*
, , averse unbiased i e  is increasing in the performance dependent wage 
component b, in the performance difference  L H p p −  and in the disadvantageous inequality 
parameter α.
19 An agent with a high α exerts high effort to decrease the probability of an 
unfavourable situation (i.e. a situation where he has only realized L p , while the other agent 
has realized H p ). Moreover, effort decreases in β.    
A comparison of inequality averse agents’ efforts (
*
, , averse unbiased i e ) with the efforts of purely 












, which can be written as
20  






I          ( 3 ) ,  
and leads to 
Proposition 3b: 
If the supervisor does not distort reports, inequality averse agents exert higher efforts in a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium than purely self-interested agents if and only if 
β β α / ) ( + < I c.   
Condition (3) shows that inequality averse agents exert higher efforts if effort costs are 
sufficiently low or the envy parameter is sufficiently high. Furthermore, condition (3) holds if 
the performance dependent wage component and the performance difference are sufficiently 
high. It illustrates that the positive effects on incentives which result from a positive effort of 
the other agent have to be quite high. If the partner effort effect dominates the negative being 
ahead effect, inequality averse agents exert higher efforts than purely self-interested agents, 
when reports are not distorted.   
                                                 
19 See Appendix C. 
20 Thus, there exists an interval [] β β α α / ) ( ), 1 ( + + I I for c that guarantees interior solutions and higher efforts 
of inequality averse agents.   16
4.3 Inequality Averse Agents and Biased Reports 
Now, let us consider the case of biased reports, when the supervisor cares for the two 
inequality averse agents. Following Proposition 1, the supervisor will report 
H
diff
i p v b r + − − = 2 / ) 1 ( β α μ  and  L
diff
j p v b r + + + = 2 / ) 1 ( β α μ  if she observes pi = H p  and                




i p v b r r + = = 2 /   μ  




i p v b r r + = = μ . Thus, agent i’s expected utility is given by  
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To determine the optimal efforts, we differentiate the agent’s expected utility with respect 
to i e : 
0
) ) ( 1 )( (( 2
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− − + + − −
= 2
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) )( ( 2
) 2 2 ( ) ( 1 2
2 / ) (
β α μ β α
β α αβ β μ β
b p p v e
b p p v
cv b e e
L H j
L H
j i  or                                      
() ( )( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 2 ) ( 2 ) 2 2 ( 1 2 2 / 1 ) ( β α μ β α β α αβ β μ β + − + + − − + + − = b I v e b I v cv e e j j i .  
Now the effort choice depends on the costs of stating a distorted performance evaluation. 
Again, the effort of agent i increases in the effort of agent j which is characterized by the 
partner effort effect.
21 However, although this effect is still positive it is lower than the effect 
if reports are not distorted. Given that agent j realizes  H p  and agent i only L p , agent i suffers 
less from being behind since the supervisor adjusts the performance appraisals and so reduces 
the difference in payoffs. The mitigation of the negative influence of β through a positive 
                                                 
21 This holds because we assume a sufficiently large performance difference  v b L H p p / ) ( β α μ + > − .   17
effort of the other agent is also decreased. Therefore, the partner effort effect is definitely 
diminished. 
Furthermore, if the supervisor adjusts reports the negative being ahead effect is diminished if 
β > ½. If agent j has only realized L p , his performance appraisal is increased by the supervisor 
and payoff differences are reduced. Since the distortion itself depends on the inequality 
parameters  β and  α, the magnitude of the reduction is also influenced by the size of α. 
However, β also decreases the report for agent I, which decreases incentives. Therefore, being 
ahead effect is only reduced if β > ½.
22 If agent i feels not much sympathy for his colleague 
(i.e.  β < ½), it even increases. This surprising result is independent of the sum of 
advantageous and disadvantageous inequality aversion  α + β. Although both agents are 
uprated if α + β < 1 and although the supervisor decreases inequality ex post, the change in 
reports is not strong enough to diminish the being ahead effect and ex ante even increases it if 
β is small. Note that the supervisor increases her performance statement by  v b 2 / μ in each 
possible situation independent of the realized performance level of the other agent. Ex ante 
incentives to exert effort are therefore not affected.    
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium ( averse biased averse biased e e , , 2
*
, , 1
* = ) both agents exert effort 
I v b cv
b I v
e averse biased i ) ( 2 ) ( 2 2




, , β α β α μ
β β α μ β
+ − + +
− + + −
= .
23  
By comparing the efforts of inequality averse agents in the situations with and without biased 
reports, we can show that 
*
, , averse biased i e  > 
*
, , averse unbiased i e  if and only if 
() () β α β + > − I c 1 2               ( 4 ) .
24 
In this case the reduction of the being ahead effect dominates the reduction of the partner 
effort effect. Condition (4) demonstrates that incentives to exert effort with unbiased reports 
are always higher compared to a situation with biased reports if β ≤ ½. If agents do not show 
compassion with each other (β = 0) but are jealous, biased reports always decrease incentives. 
If instead β > ½ and there is a reduction of the negative being ahead effect, incentives can be 
higher when reports are skewed. This leads to 
                                                 
22 Note that we subsume this incentive effect under the being ahead effect because it is relevant if agent i has 
realized a higher performance level than agent j. 
23 Optimal efforts 
*
, , averse biased i e  are smaller than one because of condition (2). 
24 A derivation can be found in Appendix C. Note that condition (4) is more restrictive than condition (2).   18
Proposition 3c: 
If both agents are inequality averse and β ≤ ½, incentives to exert effort in a symmetric 
equilibrium are higher if the supervisor does not care for agents and reports are 
unbiased.  
If both agents are inequality averse with β > ½ and effort costs are rather high 
(i.e. ) 1 2 /( ) ( − + > β β α I c ), incentives to exert effort in a symmetric equilibrium are 
higher with biased reports.  
 
Intuitively, the effect of distorting reports on incentives is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
incentives to realize  H p  are higher the more an agent suffers from having a lower 
performance level than the other agent (the higher α) in a situation with unbiased reports. This 
positive effect (working via the partner effort effect) is diminished since the supervisor’s 
reports reduce the wage gap between both agents if different performance levels are realized. 
On the other hand, efforts decrease in the amount of compassion with the other agent, i.e. the 
higher β in a situation with unbiased reports. This negative effect may also be diminished by 
the supervisor’s reports.  
Finally, we compare the efforts of inequality averse agents with the efforts of purely selfish 
agents when the supervisor cares for the agents’ utilities. Since we concentrate on interior 
solutions, an interval ( ) K L,  with L =  ) 1 ( α + I  and 
) ( 2 ) 1 2 )( (




p p v b
p p v b I
K
− − − +
− + − +
=
β β β α μ
β α β α μ
 has to exist, which is derived in Appendix C. 
The effort cost parameter c has to be above L, which describes the relevant condition for 
efforts to be smaller than one for this case (see condition 2). Then a comparison of efforts of 
inequality averse agents with the efforts of purely selfish agents shows that efforts of 
inequality averse agents are higher if c < K. However, the relevant interval () K L,  does not 
always exist. Taking condition 1 ( v b p p L H / ) ( β α μ + > − ) into account, it is obviously that 
we need a sufficiently large difference between the observed performance levels pH and pL. 
Furthermore, the inequality parameter α has to be sufficiently high for a given β to guarantee 
the existence of the interval. This leads to the following proposition: 
   19
Proposition 3d: 
If the performance difference pH – pL and α are rather high for a given β, an interval 
() K L,  for the effort cost parameter c exists, so that distorting reports lead to higher 
efforts of inequality averse agents compared to efforts of purely self-interested agents in a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
Two effects have to be taken into account. First, although the positive partner effort effect is 
diminished, it is still positive and therefore increases efforts of inequality averse agents 
compared to purely self-interested ones. Second, purely self-interested agents only take their 
own performance pay into account, when deciding about the amount of effort. In contrast, 
inequality averse agents also consider the income of the other agent and especially the 
situation, in which they themselves have realized pH  while the other agent has only realized 
pL. Without distorted reports, a higher β  decreases incentives, which characterizes the 
negative being ahead effect. This effect also exists with distorted reports. However, a higher β 
(and α) leads to a higher distortion of reports and therefore to less inequality, when reports are 
subject to the centrality and leniency bias. If β is sufficiently high (i.e. β > ½), the negative 
being ahead effect is diminished. Therefore, Proposition 3d demonstrates the conditions for 
the positive effect dominating the negative incentive effect. 
Figure 2 summarizes our results for β > ½. It pictures and compares the efforts of agents with 
different preferences (purely self-interested versus inequality averse) working with a 
supervisor who either states biased reports or the true performance of both agents. First, the 
efforts of self-oriented (egoistic) agents are lower than efforts of inequality averse agents 
without distorted reports if the positive effect for inequality averse agents (i.e. the partner 
effort effect) dominates the negative being ahead effect. This holds for the first two sections of 
Figure 2. Second, looking at the case that the supervisor cares for the agents, efforts of self-
oriented agents are lower than those of inequality averse ones if the (remaining) partner effort 
effect dominates the (remaining) being ahead effect.
 25 Third, we can compare the appraisals 
of inequality averse agents by both types of supervisors: Distorting reports increases 
incentives if the reduction of the partner effort effect is dominated by the reduction of the 
negative being ahead effect. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Note that the partner effort effect is higher if reports are unbiased.    20
Figure 2: Comparison of efforts of agents with different preferences dependent on the 






Many empirical studies have shown that subjective performance ratings of supervisors are 
subject to the centrality and leniency bias: Supervisors tend to differentiate only slightly 
between their subordinates so that ratings are compressed. Moreover, ratings are often skewed 
towards the top end of the rating scale. Our analysis offers a simple explanation for both 
biases: If supervisors care for the utility of their inequality averse subordinates, ratings may 
be distorted in both ways. The extent of the biases is influenced by the size of agents’ 
inequality aversion and the difference in observed performances, for instance.  
It is important to note that we are taking an ex ante perspective when analyzing incentives. 
Incentives are investigated before report contingent wages are paid. This is the usual 
perspective of principal agent models. Previous models with inequality averse agents have 
also chosen this approach. It is therefore neglected in these models that the outcome of 
performance appraisal may also affect future behavior of employees. A low rating, for 
instance, may discourage employees in the future and may therefore weaken incentives to 
exert effort. In contrast, it may also be possible that low rated employees show some kind of 
“now more than ever” behavior. In particular, if getting a low rating means being rated worse 
than the average, one reason for the extra motivation may be to persuade others of one’s 
ability. Bol (2006) observes that biased performance appraisal outcomes influence future 
efforts. Her study is based on data of a financial service firm. She differentiates between the 
leniency and centrality bias and shows that lenient ratings positively affect performance 
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From our ex ante point of view we show that lenient ratings do not affect incentives of purely 
self-interested agents in contrast to inequality averse agents. Incorporating this ex post 
perspective into theoretical models may be one interesting topic for future research. Taking 
additional wage costs for a principal into account, which could result from such ratings, could 
be another promising direction of research. The additional expected wage costs may outweigh 
positive incentive effects. Then the principal may not profit from engaging inequality averse 
agents compared to purely self-interested agents.  
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Appendix A 
 
If  j i p p >  and S would decide to choose a lower report for agent i or equal reports for both 
agents, she maximizes the second part of her utility function subject to  j i r r ≤ . The relevant 
Lagrange function is 
( )  r ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( 2 [ j
2 2
i j j i i i j j i j i r p r v p r v r r b br r r b br w L − + − − − − − − + − − + = η α β μ .  
 
The resulting Kuhn-Tucker-conditions are 
0   ) ( 2 ) 1 ( = − − − + + η α β μ i i p r v b           ( K 1 ’ )  
() 0 ) ( 2 1 = + − − − − η α β μ j j p r v b                            (K2’) 
0 ≥ η ,  i j r r ≥ ,  ( ) 0 = − i j r r η                                       (K3’) 
From adding K1’ + K2’ we obtain 
              j i j i r r p p v b + = + + / μ .                                            (K4’) 
 
We show by contradiction that  i j r r >  cannot be a solution to this maximization problem. If 
i j r r >  holds, η  has to be zero and we obtain  i i p v b r + + + = 2 / ) 1 ( α β μ   and          
j j p v b r + − − = 2 / ) 1 ( α β μ  from K1’ and K2’. However,  i j r r >  only holds for 
j p v b + − − 2 / ) 1 ( α β μ i p v b + + + > 2 / ) 1 ( α β μ  or  v b p p j i / ) ( α β μ + − < − . This leads to a 
contradiction since we assume j i p p > .  
 
Similarly,  i j r r =  and  0 = η  cannot be a solution. For  0 = η  we obtain 
i i p v b r + + + = 2 / ) 1 ( α β μ  and  j j p v b r + − − = 2 / ) 1 ( α β μ  from K1’ and K2’. But  i j r r =  
only holds for  v b p p j i / ) ( α β μ + − = −  which again leads to a contradiction. The last 
possible solution is  i j r r =  and  0 > η . Subtracting K2’ from K1’ leads to     
0 2 ) ( 2 ) ( 2 ) ( 2 > = − + − − + η β α μ j j i i p r v p r v b . With  i j r r =  we get 
) ( ) ( j i p p v b − + + = β α μ η  and the relevant constraint is  v b p p j i / ) ( β α μ + − > − . The 
resulting report for both agents is  ( ) 2 / 2 / j i
even p p v b r + + = μ . Since we assume  j i p p > , the 
only solution to the maximization problem of the second part of the supervisor’s utility 
function which satisfies all Kuhn-Tucker-conditions is to state equal reports 
even r  for 
0 > − j i p p .   23
Appendix B 
 
Derivation of the thresholds B and B and the optimal reports 
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Assume 0 > − nf f p p . To determine the optimal reports  0 > f r  and  0 > nf r ,  S  decides 
whether to choose different or equal reports for both agents and then picks those reports that 
maximize her utility under this constraint. Again, we first look at the first part of her utility 
function. The relevant Lagrange function is  
( )  r ) ( ) ( )] ( [ f
2 2
nf nf nf f f nf f f f r p r v p r v r r b br w L − + − − − − − − + = λ β μ .  
The resulting Kuhn-Tucker-conditions are 
0   ) ( 2 ) 1 ( = + − − − λ β μ f f f p r v b                             (K5) 
0 ) ( 2 = − − − λ β μ nf nf f p r v b                                    (K6) 
0 ≥ λ , nf f r r ≥ ,  ( ) 0 = − nf f r r λ                                  (K7) 
By adding K1 and K2 we get 
nf f nf f f r r p p v b + = + + 2 / μ .                                 (K8) 
There are two possible solutions:  nf f r r >  or  nf f r r = . If S sets  nf f r r > , it follows from K7 
that  λ  has to be zero. K5 and K6 lead to the reports  f f
diff
f p v b r + − = 2 / ) 1 ( β μ  
and nf f
diff
nf p v b r + = 2 /   β μ . However, the first part of S’s utility function is only valid for the 
range  nf f r r > . Thus if  B v b p p f nf f ≡ − > − 2 / ) 1 2 ( β μ , all conditions are satisfied and 
diff
f r  
and 
diff
nf r   solve the maximization problem.  
 
In some cases, S may set  nf f r r = . In this case we either have (I) 0 = λ  or (II) 0 > λ (see K7). 
(I) If  0 = λ ,  f f
even
f p v b r + − = 2 / ) 1 ( β μ  and  nf f
even
nf p v b r + = 2 /   β μ  will be the reports for 
the favorite and the other agent respectively (see K5 and K6). These reports solve all Kuhn-
Tucker-conditions and therefore are the solution to the maximization problem if 




f p p v b r r + + = = 5 . 0 4 /   μ .   24




f p p v b r r + + = = 5 . 0 4 /   μ  from K8. 
Subtracting K5 from K6 leads to the relevant condition for stating these reports: 
B v b p p f nf f = − < − 2 / ) 1 2 ( β μ . Since we assumed 0 > − nf f p p , equal reports 
even r  are the 
solution to the maximization problem of the first part of the utility function if the performance 
difference is rather low (i.e. B p p nf f ≤ − ) and different reports are the solution if 
B p p nf f > − . 
 
If S decides to choose a lower report for her favorite or equal reports for both agents, she 
maximizes the second part of her utility function subject to the constraint f nf r r ≥ . The 
relevant Lagrange function is 
( )  r ) ( ) ( )] ( [ nf
2 2
f nf nf f f f nf f f r p r v p r v r r b br w L − + − − − − − − + = η α μ .  
The resulting Kuhn-Tucker-conditions are 
0   ) ( 2 ) 1 ( = − − − + η α μ f f f p r v b                             (K5’) 
0 ) ( 2 = + − − − η α μ nf nf f p r v b                                (K6’) 
0 ≥ η ,  f nf r r ≥ ,  ( ) 0 = − f nf r r η                                 (K7’) 
Adding K5’ and K6’ lead to 
nf f nf f f r r p p v b + = + + 2 / μ .           ( K 8 ’ )  
 
Again, we show by contradiction that  f nf r r >  cannot be a solution to this maximization 
problem. If  f nf r r >  holds, η  has to be zero which leads to    2 / ) 1 ( ˆ f f
diff
f p v b r + + = α μ  and          
v b p r f nf
diff
nf 2 / ˆ α μ − =  (see K5’ and K6’). However,  f nf r r >  only holds for 
B v b p p f nf f ≡ + − < − 2 / ) 1 2 ( α μ . This leads to a contradiction since we assume nf f p p > . 
Similarly  f nf r r =  and  0 = η  cannot be a solution. With  0 = η  we obtain 
f f
even
f p v b r + + = 2 / ) 1 ( α μ  and  v b p r f nf
even
nf 2 / α μ − =  from K5’ and K6’. But  f nf r r =  
only holds for  B p p nf f = −  which leads to a contradiction since  0 < B  and we 
assume nf f p p > . 
 
The only possible solution is  f nf r r =  and η > 0. Subtracting K6’ from K5’ leads to 
0 2 ) ( 2 ) ( 2 ) 2 1 ( > = − + − − + η α μ nf nf f f f p r v p r v b . Taking  f nf r r =  into account we get   25
) ( 2 / ) 2 1 ( nf f f p p v b − + + = α μ η . Equal reports  ) ( 5 . 0 4 / nf f f
even p p v b r + + = μ  solve all 
Kuhn-Tucker-conditions if  B v b p p f nf f ≡ + − > − 2 / ) 1 2 ( α μ . Since we assume nf f p p > , the 
only solution to the maximization problem of the second part of the supervisor’s utility 
function which satisfies all Kuhn-Tucker-conditions is to state equal reports. Since the first 
part of the supervisor’s utility function corresponds to the second part of the utility function if 
reports are equal, different reports are only optimal if B p p nf f > − . Otherwise S sets equal 
reports. 
 
The derivation of the optimal reports follows analogously, if the favorite’s performance is at 
most as good as the performance of the other agent (i.e. 0 ≤ − nf f p p ). Our results are 
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Comparison of e
*
i,biased,averse  and e
*
i,biased,ego (Proposition 3d):  
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Note, that denominator and numerator are both negative: 
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Thus, c has to be in the interval 
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since we concentrate on interior solutions. Note that this condition only holds for sufficiently 
large performance differences and α for a given β. 
 
 
   28
References 
 
Bernardin, J. H., Buckley, R. M. (1981): Strategies in Rater Training. The Academy of 
Management Review 6, 205-212. 
Biel, P. R. (2004): Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives. ELSE Discussion Paper, 
University College London. 
Bol, J. C. (2005): Subjective Performance Evaluation. IESE Business School. University of 
Navarra. 
Bol, J. C. (2006): The Determinants and Performance Effects of Supervisor Bias. IESE 
Business School. University of Navarra. 
Bolton, G. E., Ockenfels, A. (2000): A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition. 
American Economic Review 100, 166-193. 
Bretz, R. D., Milkovich G. T., Read, W. (1992): The Current State of Performance Appraisal 
Research and Practice: Concerns, Directions, and Implications. Journal of Management 
18, 312-352. 
Cleveland, J. N., Murphy, K. R., Williams, R. E. (1989): Multiple Uses of Performance 
Appraisal: Prevalence and Correlates. Journal of Applied Psychology 74, 130-135. 
Dannenberg, A., Riechmann, T., Sturm, B., Vogt, C. (2007): Inequity Aversion and 
Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation. ZEW 
Discussion Paper No. 07-034. 
Demougin, D., Fluet, C. (2003a): Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are 
Envious. Cahier de recherche/Working Paper 03-18. 
Demougin, D., Fluet, C. (2003b): Inequity Aversion in Tournaments. Scientific Series 2003s-
18. 
Demougin, D., Fluet, C., Helm, C. (2005): Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents. 
Humboldt University Berlin. Mimeo. 
Desiraju, R., Sappington, D. E. M. (2007): Equity and Adverse Selection. Journal of 
Economics and Management Strategy 16, 285-318. 
Englmaier, F., Wambach, A. (2005): Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Inequity Aversion. 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 1643. 
Fehr, E., Schmidt, K. M. (1999): A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817-868. 
Ferris, G. R., Judge, T. A. (1991): Personnel/human Resources Management: A Political 
Influence Perspective. Journal of Management 17, 447-488. 
Fox, S., Bizman, A., Herrman, E. (1983): The Halo Effect: Is it a Unitary Concept? Journal of 
Occupational Psychology 56, 289-296.  
Grund, C., Sliwka, D. (2005): Envy and Compassion in Tournaments. Journal of Economics 
and Management Strategy 14, 187-207. 
Holmström, B., Milgrom, P.R. (1991): Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive 
Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 7, 24-52. 
Itoh, H. (2004): Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences. Japanese Economic Review 
55, 18-45.   29
Ittner, C. D., Larcker, D. F., Meyer, M. W. (2003): Subjectivity and the Weighting of 
Performance Measures: Evidence from a Balanced Scorecard. The Accounting Review 
78, 725-758. 
Jawahar, I. M., Williams, C. R. (1997): Where All The Children are Above Average: The 
Performance Appraisal Purpose Effect. Personnel Psychology 50, 905-926. 
Levy, P. E., Williams, J. R. (2004): The Social Context of Performance Appraisal: A Review 
and Framework for the Future. Journal of Management 30, 881-905. 
Loewenstein, G. F., Thompson, L., Bazerman, M. H. (1989): Social Utility and Decision 
Making in Interpersonal Contexts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57, 
426-441. 
MacLeod, W. B. (2003): Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation. The American 
Economic Review 93(1), 216-240. 
Mayer, B., Pfeiffer, T. (2004): Prinzipien der Anreizgestaltung bei Risikoaversion und 
sozialen Präferenzen. Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft 74, 1047-1075. 
Meyer, H. (1975): The Pay for Performance Dilemma. Organizational Dynamics 3, 39-50. 
Milgrom, P.R., Roberts, J. (1988): An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in 
Organizations. American Journal of Sociology, Supplement, 94, S-154-S-179. 
Murphy, K. J. (1992): Performance Measurement and Appraisal: Motivating Managers to 
Identify and Reward Performance. In: Bruns, W. J. (ed.): Performance Measurement, 
Evaluation, and Incentives, Boston, 37-62. 
Murphy, K. R., Cleveland, J. N. (1991): Performance Appraisal: An Organizational 
Perspective, Bosten: Allyn and Bacon. 
Murphy, K. R., Cleveland, J. N. (1995): Understanding Performance Appraisal. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage.   
Neilson, W. S., Stowe, J. (2004): Incentive Pay for Other-Regarding Workers. Mimeo, Duke 
University. 
Prendergast, C. (2002): Uncertainty and Incentives. Journal of Labor Economics 20, S115-
S137.  
Prendergast, C., Topel, R. (1996): Favoritism in Organizations. Journal of Political Economy 
104, 958-978.  
Sliwka, D. (2007a): Loss Aversion and Bias in Subjective Performance Evaluations. Mimeo 
University of Cologne. 
Sliwka, D. (2007b): Accuracy, Social Preferences and Bias in Subjective Performance 
Evaluation. Mimeo University of Cologne. 
Varma, A., Denisi, A. S., Peters, L. H. (1996): Interpersonal Affect and Performance 
Appraisals: A Field Study. Personnel Psychology 49, 341-360.  
von Siemens, F. (2005): Fairness, Adverse Selection, and Employment Contracts. University 
of Munich. Mimeo.  
 
 
 